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1992]
TOXIC TORTS-EVIDENCE-THIRD CIRCUIT RECOGNIZES MEDICAL
MONITORING TORT AND MAKES SIGNIFICANT RULINGS CONCERNING
EXPERT TESTIMONY IN TOXIC TORTS CASES
In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation (1990)
I. INTRODUCTION
Today's toxic tort plaintiff confronts significant legal obstacles to
recovery.' Some of these legal obstacles include the latency of toxin-
induced injuries, the problems posed by statutes of limitations and re-
pose, and the difficulty in proving causation. 2 As a result of these legal
obstacles, toxic tort victims do not recover adequate compensation for
their injuries.3 Federal and state courts have responded to the problem
1. The term "toxic tort" refers to cases in which individuals allege physical
injury or other harm as a result of exposure to a toxic substance. Jack L. Landau
& W. Hugh O'Riordan, Of Mice and Men: The Admissibility of Animal Studies to Prove
Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 521, 521 n. 1 (1988-1989). Gen-
erally, toxic tort cases involve "(1) exposure to a harmful substance; (2) which
produces consequences that are not immediately apparent (for example, dis-
eases with substantial latency periods); and (3) the connection between expo-
sure and the injuries complained of is open to reasonable dispute." Id.
2. See Leslie S. Gara, Medical Surveillance Damages: Using Common Sense and the
Common Law to Mitigate the Dangers Posed by Environmental Hazards, 12 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 265, 265-67 (1988) (discussing difficulty in proving causation); Colin H.
Buckley, Note, A Suggested Remedy for Toxic Injury: Class Actions, Epidemiology, and
Economic Efficiency, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 497, 509-22 (1985) (discussing failure
of conventional tort law that render toxic tort recovery "impossible"); Allan T.
Slagel, Note, Medical Surveillance Damages: A Solution to the Inadequate Compensation
of Toxic Tort Victims, 63 IND. L.J. 849, 851-58 (1987-1988) (discussing legal and
practical barriers to recovery in toxic tort litigation).
3. See Linda Elfenbein, Note, Future Medical Surveillance: An Award for Toxic
Tort Victims, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 795, 795 (1986) ("[T]oxic tort victims generally
have not been successful in claims for damages. Plaintiffs face procedural, sub-
stantive, and evidentiary obstacles when they attempt to bring such suits." (foot-
note omitted)). Commentators note that courts and legislatures have responded
to the inability of plaintiffs to receive adequate compensation by developing var-
ious means for recovery. See, e.g., Slagel, Note, supra note 2, at 850 ("To remove
... recovery barriers, solutions which include major changes in the tort system,
alternative compensations systems, administrative programs, and legislative ac-
tion have been proposed.").
Moreover, commentators generally recognize the inadequacy of the tradi-
tional tort system in the toxic tort context. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 168 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988)
(noting that toxic substance litigation has set courts off in new directions" be-
cause threat of future harm not yet realized traditionally has not been enough to
allow for recovery); see also Gara, supra note 2, at 265-66 ("The [tort] system's
ability to protect individuals from chemical hazards ... has been constrained by
the scientific community's frequent inability to show that exposure to a particu-
lar hazardous substance has caused an individual injury."); Buckley, Note, supra
note 2, at 509 ("[C]ommon law tort doctrines now make recovery for injuries
(1174)
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by recognizing a new cause of action, the medical monitoring tort. 4 The
medical monitoring tort is one of a growing number of non-conven-
tional torts which courts have developed to provide redress for victims
who have been exposed to toxic substances. 5 In applying the medical
monitoring tort, courts have awarded to prevailing plaintiffs the cost of
periodic medical examinations in order to detect and monitor deleteri-
ous health problems caused by toxic exposure.6 Most courts that have
addressed the viability of the medical monitoring tort have generally
recognized the cause of action. 7 These courts, however, have differed as
caused by exposure to hazardous waste impossible. We must completely restruc-
ture the tort system for compensating hazardous waste injuries."); Slagel, Note,
supra note 2, at 849 ("Under traditional tort law principles, an individual ex-
posed to a toxic substance has suffered no legally recognized injury entitling her
to compensation until she manifests a detectable disease."); Palma J. Strand,
Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Exam-
ple of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 618 (1983)
("Because toxic waste pollution injuries do not fit into this common law tort
mold, [of furthering goals of compensation, deterrence and corrective justice]
victims are not compensated. The indeterminacy of causation and the long time
lag between action and harm are special characteristics of the toxic waste
problem.").
4. For a list of cases which have recognized the medical monitoring doc-
trine, see infra note 7.
5. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 849 (3d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Knight, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991). See gener-
ally Gara, supra note 2, at 303 ("One of the failures of the tort system ... has
been the great obstacles placed between the victim ... and her ability to obtain
compensation through the courts .... The cause of action for medical surveil-
lance damages is one means of remedying this failure."); Allan Kanner, Medical
Monitoring: State and Federal Perspectives, 2 TUL. ENVTL. L.J., 1, 2 (1989)
("[C]ommon law courts and Congress have sanctioned the right of aggrieved
individuals to pursue remedies for medical monitoring .... This remedy is used
to compensate invasions of an individual's body, to deter the underlying wrong-
ful conduct, and to obtain the information needed to prosecute such medical
monitoring cases." (footnote omitted)); Slagel, Note, supra note 2, at 850 ("The
judicial solution is to award toxic tort victims the cost of medical testing ....
Early detection enhances the prospects for cure and treatment of toxic-sub-
stance-exposure illnesses, as well as enhancing the victim's chances for a pro-
longed life and minimized pain and suffering." (footnote omitted)).
6. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 849. Recognition of the medical monitoring claim ful-
fills the tort system's objective of compensating the plaintiff for his or her injury.
Slagel, Note, supra note 2, at 850. Moreover, the tort system's goal of deterrence
is satisfied by obligating the toxic substance manufacturer and disposer to be
responsible for their actions. Id.
7. See Ball v.Joy Technologies, Inc., 958 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir. 1991) (recog-
nizing the existence of medical monitoring claim under Virginia and West Vir-
ginia law), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 876 (1992); Paoli, 916 F.2d at 849-52 (predicting
that Pennsylvania Supreme Court would recognize cause of action for medical
monitoring); Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir.
1986) (holding that plaintiff ordinarily may recover reasonable medical ex-
penses, past and future, which he incurs as a result of a demonstrated injury);
Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1986) (acknowledging
New Jersey's recognition of cost of preventative monitoring due to tort as in-
dependent element of damages); Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 26
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss4/26
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37: p. 1174
to the proof required to support the medical monitoring tort.8
Another legal obstacle faced by plaintiffs in toxic tort cases is the
F.2d 1492, 1507 (11 th Cir. 1985) (applying Georgia law and finding that medical
monitoring claim is cognizable cause of action); Friends for All Children, Inc. v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 824-26 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (recognizing
cause of action for periodic diagnostic examinations/medical monitoring);
Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 847, 847-52 (M.D. Pa. 1988)
(same); Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 330, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(same); DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705, 711 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)
(same); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 503 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1985) (same); Ayers v. Township ofJackson, 461 A.2d 184, 190 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1983) (same), vacated on other grounds, 493 A.2d 1314 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987); Askey v.
Occidental Chem. Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (App. Div. 1984) (same); Habi-
tants Against Landfill Toxicants v. City of York, No. 84-S-3820, 15 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20937, 20938-39 (Pa. Ct. of C.P. of York County, May 20, 1985)
(same). But see Carroll v. Litton Sys., Inc., No. B-C-88-253, 1990 WL 312969, at
*51 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990) (stating that this court should not recognize a
common law claim for the costs of medical monitoring in the absence of clear
direction from the North Carolina courts or legislature and predicting that
North Carolina courts would refuse claim in absence of legislative directives);
Rheingold v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, No. 74 Civ. 3420, Memorandum Op. at 10
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1975) ("Plaintiff... has no legal remedy in the absence of
injury .... ); Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 885, 896
(Ct. App. 1990) ("Although we are sympathetic to [the toxic tort victim] .... we
are presently unwilling to create a new cause of action for medical monitoring
costs."), appeal granted, 806 P.2d 308 (Cal. 1990); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394
N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) ("In Illinois, possible future damages in a
personal injury action are not compensable unless reasonably certain to
occur.").
8. See Ball, 958 F.2d at 39 (court required plaintiff to demonstrate that pres-
ent physical injury had manifested itself); Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852 (court set forth
four-prong test); Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 319 (plaintiff may recover reasonable med-
ical monitoring costs which are medically advisable and result of demonstrated
injury); Herber, 785 F.2d at 83 (plaintiff permitted to present evidence that he
possessed increased risk of contracting cancer but court must find that evidence
is so probative that it could not be properly excluded because of prejudice);
Hendrix, 776 F.2d at 1507 (plaintiff required to prove with reasonable certainty
not only that he or she will sustain future medical expenses, but also amount of
surveillance costs); Carroll, 1990 WL 312969, at *51 (plaintiff must demonstrate
that physical injury or future injury were "reasonably certain"); Mateer v. U.S.
Aluminum, No. 88-2147, 1989 WL 60442, at *7 (E.D. Pa.June 6, 1989) (plaintiff
must demonstrate actual or potential injury); Merry, 684 F. Supp. at 850 (court
set forth three-prong test for recovery); Villari, 677 F. Supp. at 338 (court re-
quired showing of present physical injury); Ayers, 493 A.2d at 1323 (requiring
evidence that "defendant has so significantly increased the 'reasonable
probability' that any of plaintiffs will develop cancer" (citation omitted)); Ayers,
461 A.2d at 190 (issue is not whether it is reasonably probable that plaintiff will
suffer in future, rather relevant question is whether "it is necessary, based on
medical judgment, that a plaintiff. . . should undergo . . . medical testing in
order to properly diagnose the warning signs of the development of the dis-
ease"); Askey, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 247 (plaintiff must establish "with a reasonable
degree of medical certainty that such expenditures are 'reasonably anticipated'
to be incurred by reason of their exposure"); Habitants, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at
20938 (plaintiff must show "the potential for severe and latent injuries, and the
need for early detection and treatment").
1176
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difficulty they encounter when they attempt to present scientific evi-
dence via expert witness testimony.9 Such expert testimony is crucial to
a plaintiff's establishment of causation and damages. To introduce ex-
pert witness testimony in federal court, plaintiffs must meet the require-
ments of Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703 and 403, the goals of which
are to facilitate the admission of reliable evidence.' 0
Expert witness testimony first must meet the threshold requirement
of Rule 702, which permits the admission of expert testimony if scientific
knowledge will assist the trier of fact. I Further, under Rule 702, for the
witness to be permitted to testify as an expert, he or she must be quali-
fied as an expert through knowledge, skill, experience, training, or edu-
9. See Kenneth R. Kreiling, Scientific Evidence: Toward Providing the Lay Trier
with the Comprehensible and Reliable Evidence Necessary to Meet the Goals of the Rules of
Evidence, 32 ARIM. L. REV. 915, 915 (1990) ("As cases become more complex and
technical, the trier of fact increasingly needs science-based assistance to under-
stand the facts presented and to reach an informed determination-assistance in
the form of 'scientific evidence' that is normally presented through supposed
'experts' in the field."); see also Anne S. Toker, Note, Admitting Scientific Evidence in
Toxic Tort Litigation, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 165, 165 (1991) (noting that often
the outcome of the trial may depend largely, if not wholly, on scientific
evidence).
The plaintiffs' need to present expert testimony is juxtaposed against the
courts' general suspicion towards admitting the scientific evidence. The danger
which contributes to the courts' reluctance to admit the scientific testimony is
the aura of infallibility that envelops the evidence. See Paul C. Gianelli, The Admis-
sibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Centuy Later, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1237 (1980). Moreover, the danger includes the potential
that the scientific evidence will mislead the jury. Id.
10. See FED. R. EvID. 403, 702, 703; Kreiling, supra note 9, at 939 ("[T]he
Federal Rules, when viewed in light of the purpose of the Rules, do suggest an
approach which facilitates admission of reliable, comprehensible scientific evi-
dence."); Vicki Christian, Comment, Admissibility of Scientific Expert Testimony: Is
Bad Science Making Law?, 18 N. Ky. L. REV. 21, 35 (1990) ("The goal in seeking a
distinct rule on the admissibility of scientific testimony is to find a rule promot-
ing the admission of only reliable evidence grounded in a proven scientific
theory.").
Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID.
403.
Rule 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED.
R. EvID. 702.
Rule 703 states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EvID. 703.
11. FED. R. EvID. 702. For the text of Rule 702, see supra note 10.
4
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cation.12  Second, expert witness testimony must satisfy the
requirements of Rule 703, which requires a court to examine the relia-
bility of the evidentiary bases for the expert opinion evidence before
such evidence is admissible. 13 Finally, expert witness testimony must
conform to the mandates of Rule 403.14 Rule 403 permits courts to ex-
clude evidence otherwise admissible under Rules 702 and 703 if the
court determines that the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by the likelihood of unfairly prejudicial evidence, confusion
or deception of the jury, or unnecessary expenditure of time. 15
In In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation,16 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit attempted to mitigate the legal impedi-
ments that toxic tort victims face. 17 First, the Paoli court acknowledged
that toxic tort plaintiffs receive inadequate compensation for their inju-
ries. 18 The Paoli court predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would recognize a new cause of action-the medical monitoring tort.19
Thus, in Paoli, the Third Circuit held for the first time that a cause of
action for medical monitoring is a cognizable claim in Pennsylvania. 20
The Paoli court also adopted a standard that it believed the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would apply in granting medical monitoring damages. 2 1
Second, realizing that judicial suspicion towards the admissibility of
expert witness testimony has impeded toxic tort plaintiffs in proving
causation and damages, the Paoli court broadened the admissibility of
12. FED. R. EvID. 702. For the specific language of Rule 702, see supra note
10.
13. FED. R. EvID. 703. For the specific language of Rule 703, see supra note
10. See also Christian, Comment, supra note 10, at 25-26.
14. FED. R. EvID. 403. For the specific language of Rule 403, see supra note
10.
15. FED. R. EvID. 403. The rationale behind Rule 403 is to exclude evi-
dence that may cause the trier of fact to decide the case on an unfair or emo-
tional basis. Note, Expert Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Techniques: Admissibility
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774, 784 (1980) (citing
United States v. McRea, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862
(1979)).
16. 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v.
Knight, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991).
17. For a discussion of the laudable responsiveness of the Third Circuit to
the needs of the toxic tort plaintiff, see infra notes 112-22 and accompanying
text.
18. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 849. For a discussion of the reasons that toxic tort
victims receive insufficient compensation, see supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
19. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 849. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's recogni-
tion of the medical monitoring tort, see infra notes 53-73 and accompanying
text.
20. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852. For a discussion of the specific conclusion of
Paoli court regarding the medical monitoring claim, see infra notes 71-73 and
accompanying text.
21. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852. For a discussion of the standard that the Paoli
court adopted, see infra note 73 and accompanying text.
1178 [Vol. 37: p. 1174
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expert witness testimony under Rules 702, 703, and 403, thereby giving
plaintiffs a greater opportunity to present evidence. 22 Concerning the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence under Rule 702, the Paoli court
adopted the analysis it developed in United States v. Downing.2 3 Regard-
ing the reliability of evidence under Rule 703, the Paoli court reaffirmed
the approach it adopted in In re Japanese Electronic Products.2 4 Finally,
with respect to weighing the value of evidence under Rule 403, the Paoli
court held that Rule 403 exclusions should be utilized sparingly to avoid
the exclusion of probative evidence.
2 5
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In Paoli, thirty-eight persons who worked or lived near the Paoli
railyard brought a diversity action in April of 1986 against six defend-
ants, including Amtrak, Conrail and General Electric. 26 The plaintiffs
brought the action in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, claiming that due to the negligence of the de-
fendants, they suffered a variety of illnesses as a result of exposure to
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).2 7 PCBs are toxic substances that
were used as fluid in Paoli railcar transformers and could be found in
22. For a discussion of the liberal evidentiary position taken by the Paoli
court, see infra notes 74-111 and accompanying text.
23. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). For a discussion of the facts and holding
of the Downing court, see infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. For the
Third Circuit's treatment of the admissibility of meta-analysis, a novel scientific
technique, see infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
24. 723 F.2d 238, 276-79 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. granted in part sub nom. Matsu-
shita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 471 U.S. 1002 (1985), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986). For a discussion of the facts and holding of the Japanese Electronics case,
see infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Paoli
court's treatment of Japanese Electronics, see infra notes 85-88 and accompanying
text.
25. See Paoli, 916 F.2d at 859-60; see also DeLuca v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 957 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[If ... testimony
survives the rigors of Rule 702 and 703 . . . Rule 403 is an unlikely basis for
exclusion."); Note, supra note 15, at 784 (courts have warned that Rule 403
should be applied sparingly to avoid the exclusion of probative evidence (citing
United States v. McRea, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862
(1979))).
26. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 835. The defendants in Paoli were: Amtrak, which
owned the railyard since 1976; Conrail, operator of the railyard between 1976
and 1983; the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority (SEPTA), which has
operated the facility since 1983; Monsanto Corporation, the largest manufac-
turer of PCBs in the United States; General Electric Company, manufacturer and
supplier of the electrical transformers that contained the PCBs; and the City of
Philadelphia, owner of some of the railroad cars. Id.
27. Id. The Paoli railyard is a twenty-three acre electric railcar maintenance
facility which is the terminus for the Paoli Local, a rail line which serves the
Philadelphia Main Line. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 706 F. Supp. 358, 361
(E.D. Pa. 1988), rev'd, 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. General
Elec. Co. v. Knight, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991).
1992] 1179
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high concentrations in the air and soil surrounding the Paoli facility.
28
The plaintiffs asserted several theories of recovery based on com-
mon law tort and the medical monitoring doctrine. 2 9 The plaintiffs
sought to establish that they were exposed to PCBs and that this expo-
sure caused them harm. 30 In order to meet their burden of proof under
the tort theory, the plaintiffs relied on expert witness testimony. 3 1 The
district court, however, refused to admit a substantial portion of the
plaintiffs' evidence and declined to conduct in limine hearings regarding
its admissibility. 32 Accordingly, the defendants filed a joint motion for
summary judgment, which the district court subsequently granted in
favor of the defendants on the personal injury claims.3 3 All plaintiffs
filed an appeal to the Third Circuit from the district court's grant of
summary judgment.
3 4
28. Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 361.
29. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 836. The plaintiffs sought damages under state law
for their personal injury claims and "response costs" under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a) (1988). See Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 361. The scope of the issues before
the Third Circuit, however, was confined to common law tort and the medical
monitoring doctrine. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 835-36. For a discussion of the medical
monitoring tort, see supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
the Third Circuit's approach to the medical monitoring tort, see infra notes 53-
73 and accompanying text.
30. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 838.
31. Id. at 835. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis regarding the
expert testimony, see infra notes 74-111 and accompanying text.
32. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 854. The Third Circuit pointed out that the district
court opinion was unclear in many places as to whether it was formally excluding
or merely describing the testimony. Id. at 853. However, the Third Circuit
stated that "[in view of the [district] court's 'bottom line,' we will assume that
the court excluded the challenged evidence." Id.
33. Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 376. Subsequent to the plaintiffs' answer of the
summary judgment motion, attorneys for all parties requested oral argument.
Paoli, 916 F.2d at 836-37. The district court judge refused the request. Id. at
837.
The Third Circuit dedicated a significant portion of its opinion to a descrip-
tion and analysis of the plaintiffs' expert testimony. Id. at 838-49, 852-60. The
court's assessment regarding the admissibility of plaintiffs' evidence was crucial
to its evaluation of whether the district court's granting of the summary judg-
ment motion was proper. The Paoli court stated that "[blecause the grant of
summary judgment inexorably flowed from these evidentiary rulings, if they are
set aside, so must be the summary judgment." Id. at 835.
34. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 836-37. The Paoli court's opinion based on this appeal
not only dealt with the medical monitoring claim and the evidentiary issues, but
it also concerned three other issues which are not within the scope of this
casebrief. First, the Paoli court rejected the defendants' attacks on the court's
appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 837-38. Second, the Paoli court considered and
granted the Butler plaintiffs' motion to amend. Id. at 863. Finally, the Paoli court
found that the plaintiffs had not complied with a statute requiring notice of in-
jury to SEPTA. Id. at 863-65. However, the Paoli court further stated that such
non-compliance could be excused if SEPTA failed to show prejudice. Id. at 865.
7
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Review of the Record
Before beginning its legal analysis, the Paoli court reviewed the rec-
ord on which the district court based its grant of summary judgment.
3 5
The Paoli court summarized the district court's analysis of the plaintiffs'
expert witnesses and evidence, and its examination of the plaintiffs'
prima facie case.3 6 In order to prove abnormal exposure and causation,
the plaintiffs primarily relied upon nine experts.3 7 The Paoli court ex-
haustively discussed each of the experts' qualifications, the facts upon
which the experts based their opinions, and the testimony of each wit-
ness. The testimony of Dr. Deborah A. Barsotti, Dr. Arthur C. Zahalsky
and Dr. Ian C.T. Nisbet was the crucial testimony for the Paoli court's
legal analysis.
3 8
In its review of the record, the Third Circuit also discussed and
noted the importance of the meta-analysis technique advanced by plain-
tiffs' expert, Dr. Nicholson.3 9 Dr. Nicholson employed this technique in
order to prove that current epidemiologic studies support a conclusion
35. Id. at 838-49.
36. Id. at 838-45.
37. Id. at 838-41.
38. Id. A number of the plaintiffs adduced the testimony of Deborah A.
Barsotti, Ph.D., a toxicologist who received her doctorate in pathology and was
serving, at the time of the testimony, as the Chief of the Research Analysis
Branch of the Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry of the United
States. Id. at 839. Dr. Barsotti offered expert opinions as to both exposure and
causation. Id. Dr. Barsotti stated that she traced the PCBs in the plaintiffs' bod-
ies to the Paoli railyard by using gas chromatography. Id. Dr. Barsotti also
opined with "reasonable scientific certainty," that the PCBs were the cause of
many of the diseases that plaintiffs had contracted. Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 369-
70. As the Third Circuit noted, however, the district court seemed to have ex-
cluded Dr. Barsotti's testimony pursuant to Rule 702. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 855; see
also Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 369-70. The district court found that Dr. Barsotti was
not qualified as a chemist to testify as to gas chromatography, nor was she quali-
fied as a medical doctor to present evidence concerning the cause of plaintiffs'
illnesses. Id. For the text of Rule 702, see supra note 10. For a discussion of
Rule 702, see supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
Plaintiffs also proffered the testimony of Arthur C. Zahalsky, Ph.D., who had
received his doctorate degree in microbiology. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 839. Dr.
Zahalsky owned an immunological consulting firm and was a college professor
of immunology and human diseases. Id. Dr. Zahalsky submitted that plaintiffs
had suffered immune system injuries due to their exposure to PCBs at Paoli. Id.
at 840. However, the district court refused to admit the testimony because he
was "not trained in differential diagnosis." Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 370; Paoli, 916
F.2d at 855.
Ian C.T. Nisbet, Ph.D., who received his doctorate degree in physics from
Cambridge University, served as the president of a scientific consulting firm and
published work in the environmental science area. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 840-41.
The district court also rejected Dr. Nisbet's testimony because, inter alia, there is
"nothing in . . . [his] curriculum vita that would qualify him to testify as an ex-
pert in this area." Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 372; see Paoli, 916 F.2d at 855.
39. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 841, 856-59.
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that PCBs are causally linked to deleterious health effects in humans. 40
The Paoli court explained that meta-analysis is a technique which com-
bines the results of various epidemiological studies done by other scien-
tists, and re-analyzes the combined data to evaluate whether the data
renders different results than individual studies conducted with a
smaller data sample. 4 1 Finally, the Third Circuit noted three sources
that the plaintiffs' experts relied upon for their testimony: animal stud-
ies purporting to demonstrate the harmful health effects of PCBs, stud-
ies utilizing data from the Yusho and Yu Cheng studies and the experts'
own research and opinions.
42
Although the Paoli court did not discuss the animal studies that the
plaintiffs relied upon, it noted that the animal studies purported to
demonstrate the deleterious health effects of PCBs. 4 3 The district court
had excluded the animal studies based on Rule 703 because the court
found the studies were irrelevant.4 4
The evidence based on the Yusho and Yu Cheng incidents was par-
ticularly relevant to the Third Circuit's opinion.4 5 Some of the experts
used the Yusho and Yu Cheng incidents as possible bases for their opin-
ions regarding causation. 46 The Yusho and Yu Cheng incidents, which
occurred in Japan and Taiwan in the 1960s, involved the contamination
of rice oil with ajapanese brand of PCBs. 4 7 Persons who ingested food
cooked with this rice oil contracted various diseases. 4 8 The district
court, however, excluded from evidence any expert opinion based on
studies of the Yusho and Yu Cheng incidents. 49
The Third Circuit opinion also discussed the district court's defini-
tion of the plaintiffs' prima facie case. 50 The district court had stated
that the plaintiffs would need to prove four elements: "1) that defend-
ants released PCBs into the environment; 2) that plaintiffs somehow in-
gested these PCBs into their bodies; 3) that plaintiffs have an injury;
40. Id. at 841. Based on the meta-analysis, Dr. Nicholson concluded that
exposure to PCBs can cause liver, gall bladder and biliary tract disorders. Id.
Specifically, the Third Circuit pointed out that the plaintiffs must prove causa-
tion to survive a motion for summary judgment, and meta-analysis is one of the
few pieces of direct evidence indicating that PCBs in fact cause disease. Id. at
856.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 845.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 846.
45. See id. at 854.
46. Id. at 846.
47. Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 368.
48. Id. After reviewing the scientific community's opinions, the district
court found that the incidents occurred due to the consumption of toxic PCDFs
and that the incidents are not evidence of the effects of PCBs. Id.
49. Id.
50. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 848-49.
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[and] 4) that PCBs are the cause of that injury." 5 1 Because the district
court excluded almost all of the plaintiffs' evidence, the court concluded
that the plaintiffs were unable to prove the four elements of their case.
5 2
B. Medical Monitoring Claim
In its legal analysis, the Paoli court first evaluated the plaintiffs'
medical monitoring claim. 5 3 Through this claim, the plaintiffs sought to
recover the costs of future periodic medical examinations that they al-
leged were medically necessary to prevent the manifestation of latent
diseases brought about by PCB exposure. 54 The Paoli court acknowl-
edged that neither the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nor the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court had yet confronted the issue of whether a
plaintiff's claim for the cost of preventative medical surveillance was a
valid cause of action.5 5 The Paoli court explained that because it was
sitting in diversity, its task was to predict whether the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would recognize a claim for medical monitoring under
the Pennsylvania substantive law and, if so, to define the elements of
such a claim.
5 6
After describing the medical monitoring tort, the Paoli court distin-
guished this tort from the similar claim of enhanced risk of harm, which
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court previously had expressed caution in
recognizing. 5 7 The Paoli court posited that the supreme court's cautious
position towards recognizing enhanced risk claims would not extend to
medical monitoring claims. 58 The Paoli court explained that the proper
51. Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 375.
52. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 849.
53. Id. at 849-52. For an explanation of the medical monitoring tort, see
supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
54. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 849.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
57. Id. at 849-50; see Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1094
n.5 (Pa. 1985) (stating that plaintiff, in asserting enhanced risk of harm claim,
must present evidence from which jury can reasonably determine degree to
which future consequences of present injury are probable, not just possible) (em-
phasis in original)), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Martin v. Owens-Corning Fiber-
glas Corp., 528 A.2d 947 (Pa. 1987). The Paoli court discussed various non-
traditional torts that recently have been adopted by courts to allow plaintiffs
recovery without present manifestations of physical injury. Paoli, 916 F.2d at
849-50. The Paoli court provided examples in the toxic tort context, such as
recovery for emotional distress resulting from fear of contracting a future dis-
ease and the enhanced risk of future harm. Id.
The Paoli court defined medical monitoring claims as actions seeking to re-
cover only the costs of periodic medical examinations that are needed to dis-
cover the manifestation of disease. Id. at 850. In contrast, the Paoli court
characterized enhanced risk claims as those claims seeking compensation for the
expected injury, proportionately reduced to reflect the probability that it will not
appear. Id.
58. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 849-52. More importantly, the Paoli court opined that
19921 1183
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inquiry in a medical monitoring claim is not whether it is reasonably
probable that plaintiffs will suffer injury in the future, as is the case in
enhanced risk claims. 59 Rather, the Paoli court stated that the appropri-
ate inquiry is whether medical monitoring is, to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, necessary to properly detect the manifestation of
disease.
60
After determining that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would be
likely to recognize the tort of medical monitoring, the Paoli court then
determined the analysis the supreme court would apply. 6 ' To accom-
plish this task, the Paoli court examined and compared approaches taken
by two Pennsylvania federal courts that had considered the appropriate
standard for a medical monitoring claim under Pennsylvania law. 62 The
first case examined by the Paoli court was Villari v. Terminix International,
Inc.,63 which was decided by the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 64 The Villari court allowed the plain-
tiffs' request for the costs of future medical monitoring. 6 5 However, the
Villari court required that the plaintiffs demonstrate present physical in-
jury in order to recover future monitoring costs.
6 6
The second case the Paoli court considered was Merry v. Westinghouse
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not require a demonstration of reason-
able probability of harm in medical monitoring claims. Id. The Paoli court
reached its conclusion by distinguishing the facts in Paoli from the facts in Mar-
tin. Id. at 850-51; see also Martin, 494 A.2d at 1092-93. Primarily, the Paoli court
stated that the injury in Martin was different from the injury in Paoli. Paoli, 916
F.2d at 850-51. The Paoli court explained that an injury involved in an enhanced
risk claim is speculative because courts are compelled to predict the probability
that the injury will manifest itself. Id. 'However, the Paoli court pointed out that
the injury in a medical monitoring claim is much less speculative because the
jury need only determine whether the plaintiff requires medical surveillance. Id.
The Paoli court also stated that if the supreme court was concerned with
recognizing the medical monitoring claim, it could require that the jury deter-
mine that the requested medical monitoring "is probably, not just possibly, neces-
sary." Id. at 851 (emphasis added).
59. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 851.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 852.
62. Id. at 851-52. For a discussion of the two district court opinions that the
Third Circuit compared, see infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
63. 677 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
64. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852. In Villari, homeowners, individually and on be-
half of their minor children, brought an action against Terminix, a pest control
company. Villari, 677 F. Supp. at 331-32. Plaintiffs claimed that Terminix con-
taminated their home with a hazardous termiticide. Id. Plaintiffs alleged a vari-
ety of theories of recovery, one of which was for the costs of future medical
monitoring. Id.
65. Villari, 677 F. Supp. at 338.
66. Id. The Villari court, however, explicitly stated that the plaintiffs were
not required to have exhibited symptoms of the particular diseases for which they
sought medical surveillance damages, but did need to show some physical in-
jury. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Paoli court pointed out that because the
plaintiffs in Villari had sufficiently demonstrated physical injury, the Villari court
1184 [Vol. 37: p. 1174
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Electric Corp.6 7 In Merry, the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania explicitly rejected the Villari court's putative
physical injury requirement. 68 The Mery court agreed with the Villari
court that plaintiffs need not exhibit symptoms of disease to recover for
medical surveillance. 69 The Merry court held that in order to recover for
medical monitoring costs, a plaintiff must prove three elements: expo-
sure to hazardous substances, potential for injury and the need for early
detection and treatment.
70
In predicting the approach that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would take, the Third Circuit in Paoli adopted the general standard uti-
lized by the Merry court. 7 1 The Paoli court, however, established four
elements that constitute a cause of action for medical monitoring in
did not decide the issue of whether medical monitoring costs could be recover-
able without such a showing. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852.
By requiring a showing of present physical injury, the Villari court expressly
refused to follow Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 461 A.2d 184 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 493 A.2d 1314 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987). See Villari, 677 F. Supp.
at 338, n.5. In Ayers, the New Jersey Superior Court enunciated the following
standard for recovery based on a medical monitoring claim:
It is not the reasonable probability of whether plaintiffs will suffer can-
cer in the future that should determine whether medical surveillance is
necessary. Rather, it is whether it is necessary, based on medical judg-
ment, that a plaintiff who has been exposed to known carcinogens at
various levels should undergo annual medical testing in order to prop-
erly diagnose the warning signs of the development of the disease. If it
is necessary, then the probability of the need for that medical surveil-
lance is cognizable as part of plaintiffs' claim.
Ayers, 461 A.2d at 190. The plaintiffs in Villari did not adequately persuade the
district court that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt this approach.
Villari, 677 F. Supp. at 338 n.5.
67. 684 F. Supp. 847 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
68. Id. at 849. In Merry, property owners whose wells had been contami-
nated by toxic substances brought an action against Westinghouse for, inter alia,
medical monitoring damages. Id. at 847-58.
69. Id. at 849.
70. Id. The three requirements articulated by the Merry court were ex-
tracted from Habitants Against Landfill Toxicants v. City of York, No. 84-S-
3820, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20937, 20938-39 (Pa. Ct. of C.P. of York
County, May 20, 1985). See Merry, 684 F. Supp. at 850. The Merry court held:
[T]he plaintiffs, through their experts' reports, have created an issue of
fact as to the probability of contracting a serious illness as a result of
exposure to the hazardous substances in their wells. It would be rea-
sonable for a jury to conclude that the plaintiffs have a significantly but
unquantifiably enhanced risk of serious disease, and that such en-
hanced risk of disease justifies periodic medical examinations.
Id. at 852. Consequently, the Merry court denied Westinghouse's motion for
summary judgment on the plaintiffs' medical monitoring claim. Id.
The Merry court found that the approaches adopted by the courts in Habi-
tants and Ayers were consistent with Pennsylvania public policy and tort law.
Merry, 684 F. Supp. at 848-52.
71. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852. For a discussion of the Merry standard, see supra
notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
19921 1185
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 26
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss4/26
1186 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37: p. 1174
Pennsylvania. 72 In order to recover for medical monitoring costs, the
Paoli court held that a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) that the plaintiff
was significantly exposed to a hazardous substance due to the negligent
actions of the defendant; 2) that as a proximate result of the exposure,
the plaintiff suffers a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious
latent disease; 3) that the increased risk makes periodic diagnostic med-
ical examinations reasonably necessary; and 4) that monitoring proce-
dures exist which make the early detection and treatment of the disease
possible and beneficial.
7 3
C. Evidentiary Issues in the Toxic Tort Setting
After recognizing the availability of the medical monitoring tort in
Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit in Paoli focused its attention on the evi-
dentiary issues in the case.7 4 The Third Circuit assumed that the district
court had excluded the bulk of the plaintiffs' evidence as unreliable, and
thus the Third Circuit considered whether the district court had done so
properly. 75 The Third Circuit scrutinized the evidence presented at trial
and evaluated the propriety of the district court's evidentiary rulings
under Federal Rules of Evidence 703, 702 and 403.76
72. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852.
73. Id. In supporting its holding, the Paoli court stated that the policy rea-
sons for recognizing a medical monitoring cause of action are supported by the
conventional goals of the Pennsylvania tort system. Id. First, the Paoli court
noted that medical monitoring claims, in this toxic age, recognize that an indi-
vidual can be substantially injured, notwithstanding latent manifestation of that
harm. Id. Second, the Paoli court pointed out that medical monitoring claims do
not require a court to speculate about the probability of future injury. Id. In-
stead, the Paoli court stated that a medical monitoring claim merely requires the
factfinder to determine the probability that the far less expensive remedy of
medical surveillance is appropriate. Id. Finally, the Paoli court recognized that
allowing recovery for this claim would deter the careless discharge of toxic sub-
stances by defendants and encourage plaintiffs to bring timely actions for the
detection and treatment of their injuries. Id.
74. Id. at 852-60.
75. Id. at 852-53. The Paoli court stated:
As we have explained . . . , the text of the district court opinion, which
attacks many of plaintiffs' expert opinions without formally excluding
them, suggests that the court was merely describing, not excluding, the
testimony. However, at other times the court appears to have excluded
most if not all of the testimony. In view of the court's "bottom line," we
will assume that the court excluded the challenged evidence.
Id. at 853.
The Paoli court then explained that if the district court's exclusions were
proper, summary judgment was appropriately granted. Id. However, the Paoli
court acknowledged that it had to determine whether the evidence was properly
excluded. Id.
76. Id. at 852-60. For a discussion of the evidence presented for the district
court's consideration, see supra notes 38-40. For a discussion of the Paoli court's
analysis of the propriety of the district court's evidentiary rulings, see infra notes
77-106 and accompanying text.
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1. Interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 703
The Third Circuit in Paoli first considered the district court's analy-
sis under Rule 703. 77 The district court had found that much of the
plaintiffs' scientific evidence was unreliable and excludable under Rule
703.78 The Paoli court, however, found that the district court's analysis
fatally deviated from the Rule 703 protocols established in In rejapanese
Electronic Products.79 Thus, the Paoli court relied on the Japanese Electronics
protocols in overturning the district court's exclusion of the plaintiffs'
expert testimony evidence based on Rule 703. 80
In Japanese Electronics, the Third Circuit set forth the standard for
determining whether an expert's informational foundation is of the type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field, and thus admissible
under Rule 703.81 The Japanese Electronics court stated that the proper
issue is not what courts determine to be reliable, but rather what experts
in the relevant field deem reliable. 82 Moreover, the Japanese Electronics
court demanded that, as a matter of law, the district court must make a
factual determination as to the facts which the experts in the field deem
to be reliable.
83
The Paoli court concluded that the Japanese Electronics case mandated
that the district court have a proper foundation for making its admissi-
bility findings.84 The Paoli court then applied the Japanese Electronics
standard to the animal studies that several of the plaintiffs' witnesses
utilized as a factual foundation for their opinions. 85 The Paoli court
found that the district court had improperly excluded the opinions that
were based on these animal studies.8 6 The court suggested that the dis-
77. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 853-54; see also FED. R. EviD. 703. For the text of Rule
703, see supra note 10.
78. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 853. For a discussion of the evidence that was re-
viewed by the district court, see supra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
79. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 853-54; see also In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d
238, 276-79 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. granted in part sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 471 U.S. 1002 (1985), and rev'd on other grounds, 475
U.S. 574 (1986). In Japanese Electronics, American television manufacturers
brought suit against Japanese manufacturers and others on the theories of anti-
trust, tariff and antidumping violations. Id. at 238. The district court had ex-
cluded expert testimony under both Rules 702 and 703, and granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. Id. at 276-79. The Third Circuit reversed
those rulings. Id. at 278.
80. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 853-54.
81. Japanese Electronics, 723 F.2d at 277.
82. Id. Thus, the Third Circuit in Japanese Electronics found that the trial
court had erred in its interpretation of Rule 703 by substituting its own opinion
as to what constituted reasonable reliance instead of determining what experts
in the relevant fields deemed reliable. Id.
83. Id. Further, the Japanese Electronics court stated that "[t]here is no dis-
cretion to forbear from making this inquiry and finding." Id.
84. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 853.
85. Id. at 853-54.
86. Id. at 853. The Paoli court pointed out that the district court seemed to
19921 1187
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trict court should have identified the theory upon which it rejected the
opinions and should have indicated which opinions it intended to ex-
clude. 87 Because the district court did not articulate the facts it relied
upon in making its legal determination, the Paoli court set aside the dis-
trict court's evidentiary exclusions.
8 8
Similarly, the Third Circuit in Paoli found that the district court's
treatment of the Yusho and Yu Cheng studies as a foundation for expert
opinions was flawed. 89 The Third Circuit rejected the district court's
finding to exclude expert opinions based on these two studies because
the district court did not specify the scientific literature on which it
based its determination. 90 Thus, the Third Circuit, based on Rule 703,
abrogated the evidentiary exclusions the district court had made. 9 1
2. Interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 702
The Third Circuit next considered the propriety of the district
court's exclusions based on Rule 702.92 First, the Third Circuit reviewed
the district court's rejection of expert witnesses as unqualified to give
testimony in a particular field.93 The Third Circuit stated that the dis-
have excluded the expert testimony based on the animal studies. Id. The district
court had stated that it had "very convincing evidence on the record that says
that these studies are irrelevant." Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 368. However, the Paoli
court emphasized that such an untenable statement is not sufficient without a
specific discussion of the evidence that led the district court to its conclusion
that the opinions were unreliable. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 853.
87. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 853. The Paoli court indicated that the district court
should have disclosed "the evidence in the voluminous record it has chosen to
credit." Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 854. The district court stated that it excluded the expert opinions
based on the Yusho and Yu Cheng incidents because "the consensus conclusion
from the scientific literature is that the diseases that occurred in the victims of
these incidents were caused by the ingestion of highly toxic PCDFs with their
food and is not evidence of the effects of PCBs." Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 368. For a
discussion of the Yusho and Yu Cheng studies, see supra notes 45-49 and accom-
panying text.
90. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 854. The Paoli court also concluded that the district
court erred by not specifying which opinions it was excluding based on the
Yusho and Yu Cheng incidents. Id.
91. Id. The Paoli court directed the district court, on remand, to reconsider,
in light of the Japanese Electronics guidelines, the district court rulings that in-
volved factual inquiry into the basis for expert opinions. Id. at 854-55.
In its analysis of the evidence excluded under Rule 703, the Paoli court also
considered whether the district court afforded the plaintiffs adequate process for
defending against the evidentiary exclusions. Id.
92. Id. at 855. The Third Circuit divided the district court's Rule 702 exclu-
sions into two classes: "(1) rejection of the witness as unqualified to give expert
testimony in the relevant field; and (2) rejection of the expert because, however
qualified, he or she was relying on an unreliable scientific technique." Id. (foot-
note omitted). For the text of Rule 702, see supra note 10.
93. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 855-56. The Paoli court referred to the three wit-
nesses that the district court seemed to have rejected as unqualified. Id. The
[Vol. 37: p. 11741188
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trict court had excluded some of the expert witness' testimony by deter-
mining that the expert did not possess appropriate degrees or
training.94 The Third Circuit noted that requiring an expert to have a
particular background contradicts the jurisprudence in this area. 95 In
addition, the Third Circuit looked to the liberal language of Rule 702
and concluded that the district court abused its discretion by excluding
several of the plaintiffs' experts as unqualified.
96
For example, the Third Circuit examined the district court's exclu-
sion of Dr. Nicholson's meta-analysis technique. 9 7 The district court had
examined the meta-analysis technique under the standard announced in
Paoli court first looked to the district court's rejection of Dr. Barsotti. Id. Dr.
Barsotti was rejected on the grounds that she was neither a chemist qualified to
discuss gas chromatography, nor a medical doctor qualified to explain the cause
of plaintiffs' injuries. Id.; see also Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 369-70. In addition, the
Paoli court noted that the district court rejected Dr. Zahalsky's opinion on the
effect of PCBs on humans because Dr. Zahalsky was not trained in differential
diagnosis. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 855; see also Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 374. Similarly, the
Paoli court indicated that the district court excluded Dr. Nesbet's [sic] testimony
because his " 'curriculum vita [did not] qualify him to testify as an expert' " as to
whether a specific study was accurate. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 855; see also Paoli, 706 F.
Supp. at 371. For a discussion of the qualifications, the facts upon which these
three experts based their opinions, and the testimony of each expert, see supra
note 38 and accompanying text.
94. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 855.
95. Id. at 855. The Paoli court specified several cases which represented the
liberal approach of the Third Circuit in finding a witness qualified to give testi-
mony. Id.; see Habecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893 F.2d 49, 52-53 (3d Cir. 1990)
(permitting safety specialist, although not an engineer, who had master's degree
in safety education and doctorate in human factors and product safety design to
testify as to whether forklift manufacturer's failure to install forklift seatbelts
caused death of forklift operator); Hammond v. International Harvester Co.,
691 F.2d 646, 653 (3d Cir. 1982) (authorizing expert to testify in tractor prod-
ucts liability case although his only qualifications were sales experience in agri-
cultural equipment field and teaching automotive repair); Knight v. Otis
Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 88 (3d Cir. 1979) (allowing expert to testify in eleva-
tor design defect case although expert did not have specific background in eleva-
tor design and manufacture).
96. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 855-56. For the language of Rule 702, see supra note
10. In addition to the language of Rule 702, the Paoli court referred to the Rule
702 Advisory Committee notes which emphasize that various kinds of "knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training or education" qualify an expert. FED. R. EVID.
702 advisory committee's note.
The Paoli court scrutinized the qualifications of the three witnesses that the
district court had rejected. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 855-56. The Paoli court found that
the district court abused its discretion in excluding the witnesses based on Rule
702. Id. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of the district court's
findings regarding the qualifications of the witnesses, see supra notes 92-94 and
accompanying text.
97. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 856-59. The exclusion of Dr. Nicholson's testimony is
the second category of excluded evidence that the Paoli court discussed: the re-
jection of the witness because, however qualified, he or she was relying on an
unreliable scientific technique. Id. at 855. The Paoli court noted that the district
court used Rule 702 to exclude Dr. Nicholson's testimony because the court
found that Dr. Nicholson's meta-analysis was an inadmissible scientific tech-
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United States v. Downing 98 for evaluating expert testimony based on novel
scientific techniques. 99 Although the Downing relevancy approach has
been utilized in many jurisdictions, the circuit courts are divided as to
the proper test for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence.10 0
nique. Id. at 856. For a discussion of the significance of Dr. Nicholson's testi-
mony, see supra note 39-4 1.
98. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
99. In re Paoli R.R. Yard, 706 F. Supp. 358, 373 (E.D. Pa. 1988), rev'd, 916
F.2d 829 PCB Litig. (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v.
Knight, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991). In Downing, the defendant had been convicted
of mail fraud solely on the basis of eyewitness testimony. Downing, 753 F.2d at
1226. The Downing court considered the issue of whether Rule 702 allowed a
defendant to present testimony from an expert in the field of human perception
and memory regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification. Id. The Down-
ing court opined that the district court had excluded the evidence apparently
because the court believed that the psychologist's testimony did not meet the
Rule 702 "helpfulness" requirement. Id. The Downing court held that the district
court erred in excluding the evidence and stated:
The language of Fed.R.Evid. 702, the spirit of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in general, and the experience with the Frye test suggest the
appropriateness of a more flexible approach to the admissibility of
novel scientific evidence. In our view, Rule 702 requires that a district
court ruling upon the admission of [novel] scientific evidence . .. con-
duct a preliminary inquiry focusing on (1) the soundness and reliability
of the process or technique used in generating the evidence, (2) the
possibility that admitting the evidence would overwhelm, confuse, or
mislead the jury, and (3) the proffered connection between the scien-
tific research or test result to be presented, and particular disputed fac-
tual issues in the case.
Id. at 1237.
Other courts have followed the rationale of the Downing court. See Ellis v.
International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 301-05 (4th Cir. 1984) (adoption of
reliability approach); United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir. 1989)
(same); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198-1200 (2d Cir. 1978)
(adoption of reliability approach with court review focused on reliability of sci-
entific evidence and its tendency to mislead), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979);
United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.) (adoption of reliability
approach), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976).
The Paoli court noted that the reliability issue is critical because defendants
alleged that meta-analysis is too unreliable to be accepted by the court. Paoli,
916 F.2d at 856.
100. Many jurisdictions continue to follow the test which was articulated in
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the defendant had
been convicted of second degree murder, and he appealed the judgment con-
tending that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence. Id. at 1013. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia considered the admissibility of the
systolic blood pressure deception test. Id. The Frye court, in an oft-quoted pas-
sage, established the Frye "general acceptance" standard:
Just when a scientific principle of discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recog-
nized, and while the courts will go a long way in admitting expert testi-
mony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery,
the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. at 1014 (emphasis added). The Frye court held that the systolic blood pres-
1190
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The Paoli court affirmed the district court's utilization of the Down-
ing standard, but held that the district court's analysis under Downing was
inherently flawed.1 0 ' In its analysis, the Paoli court concentrated on the
reliability prong of the Downing standard.' 0 2 The Paoli court refused to
designate the exact level of scrutiny at which a district court can exclude
a technique as sufficiently unreliable.10 3 However, the Paoli court found
sure test had not gained the scientific recognition among authorities that would
justify its admission. Id.
The current status of the Frye test is difficult to evaluate. Gianelli, supra note
9, at 1228. The status of the test has been widely debated and criticized. See
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 608 (Edward W.
Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) (discussing criticisms of Frye approach and stating that
most appealing method for evaluating admissibility of scientific evidence is that
"[g]eneral scientific acceptance is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of
scientific facts, but it is not a suitable criterion for the admissibility of scientific
evidence"); Kreiling, supra note 9, at 921 (noting that most important objection
to Frye is that test fails to even consider what is often crucial reliability issue:
whether technique was properly used (citing Gianella, supra note 9, at 1226));
Gianelli, supra note 9, at 1250 ("The Frye test, which has cast its shadow over the
admissibility of scientific evidence for more than a half-century, has proved
unworkable.").
A significant issue in this area is whether the lack of reference to the Frye
standard in the Federal Rules of Evidence indicates an abrogation of the test.
See Kreiling, supra note 9, at 927. Some commentators argue, however, that the
rules do not indicate an intent to abolish the Frye test. See, e.g., id. ("There is,
however, no indication in the legislative history that the Federal Rules supplant
Frye.").
101. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 856. The Paoli court first affirmed the decision to
analyze the meta-analysis technique under Rule 702 instead of Rule 703. Id. The
Third Circuit stated:
[Tihe determination whether expert testimony depends on a reliable
"scientific technique," to be analyzed under Rule 702, or whether the
basis for testimony is "facts or data ... of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field," to be analyzed under Rule 703 ... is
ofttimes subtle if not strained.
Id. The difference, the Paoli court pointed out, is whether the problem with the
scientific evidence lies in the underlying data itself or the method used to ana-
lyze the data. Id. The Paoli court looked to the rule established in DeLuca v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 952-57 (3d Cir. 1990). The
DeLuca court stated that if a scientist's methodology is being attacked, but not
the underlying data relied upon, the court must examine the reliability of the
methodology under Downing and Rule 702. Id. at 954; see also Paoli, 916 F.2d at
856-57.
In discussing the reliability requirement of Downing, the Paoli court recog-
nized that the balance is weighted towards admitting the testimony. Id. at 857;
Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237. As the DeLuca court pointed out, there is "a strong
and undeniable preference for admitting any evidence having some potential for
assisting the trier of fact and for dealing with the risk of error through the adver-
sary process." DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 956.
102. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 857. The Paoli court referred to the absence of evi-
dence on the record that meta-analysis is an inaccurate mode of analysis. Id.
Indeed, the Paoli court pointed out that defendants' own experts did not ques-
tion the reliability of meta-analysis in general. Id. Instead, the experts ques-
tioned the way in which Dr. Nicholson applied the meta-analysis technique. Id.
103. Id. at 858. The Paoli court stated:
19921 1191
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that in this case the district court did not make specific enough findings
on the reliability of the meta-analysis to satisfy Downing.,0 4 Therefore,
the Paoli court set aside the district court's exclusion of the meta-analysis
technique.1
0 5
3. Interpretation of Federal Rule 403
The Paoli court's final consideration was the pre-trial exclusions of
evidence by the district court based upon Rule 403.106 The court stated
that exclusions at the pre-trial stage based on Rule 403 are rarely neces-
sary. 10 7 The Paoli court found that in order to exclude evidence under
Rule 403 at the pre-trial stage, a court must have a complete record.' 0 8
Because the record was deficient in this respect, the Paoli court set aside
the district court's exclusions of evidence based on Rule 403.109
The Paoli court ultimately held that, contrary to the conclusion of
the district court, the plaintiffs submitted sufficient evidence to survive a
Reliability indicia vary so much from case to case that any attempt to
define such a level would most likely be pointless. Downing itself lays
down a flexible rule. What is not flexible under Downing is the require-
ment that there be a developed record and specific findings on reliabil-
ity issues.
Id.
104. Id. The district court had excluded Dr. Nicholson's report because it
had "not been peer-reviewed or accepted by anybody in particular." Paoli, 706
F. Supp. at 373. The district court based its exclusion on a defense expert's
affidavit which stated that "the report has [n]ever been subjected to pre-publica-
tion review, and the report has never been published in the scientific literature."
Paoli, 916 F.2d at 857-58. The Third Circuit held that these were insufficient
grounds for excluding the testimony. Id. at 858. The Paoli court first stated that
there is no requirement that an expert's testimony be based on peer-reviewed or
published data. Id. (citing DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 954). Second, the Paoli court
noted that Dr. Nicholson's own affidavit contradicted the defense expert's affida-
vit and stated that his report, in fact, had been peer-reviewed. Id. at 858.
105. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 858.
106. Id. at 859-60. Again, the Paoli court expressed its uncertainty that the
district court actually excluded any evidence based on Rule 403. Id. at 859. The
Paoli court assumed this because of a suggestion that the district court was ex-
cluding all of plaintiffs' evidence under Rules 403 and 703. See Paoli, 706 F.
Supp. at 369. For the relevant text of Rule 403, see supra note 10.
107. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 859. The Paoli court reasoned that a finding that
evidence was more prejudicial than probative was an extreme measure at the
pre-trial stage because no harm is done by admitting the evidence. Id. Conse-
quently, the Paoli court authoritatively found that "[p]recipitous Rule 403 deter-
minations, before the challenging party has had an opportunity to develop the
record, are therefore unfair and improper." Id. The Paoli court also found that
the district court did not conduct the balancing that is required by Rule 403. Id.
108. Id. The Paoli court stated that "we hold that in order to exclude evi-
dence under Rule 403 at the pretrial stage, a court must have a record complete
enough on the point at issue to be considered a virtual surrogate for a trial rec-
ord." Id. at 859-60. Further, the Paoli court suggested that in complex litigation
involving numerous experts and intricate scientific testimony, an in limine hear-
ing may be very useful. Id. at 859.
109. Id. at 860.
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motion for summary judgment on each element of their prima facie
case.I 10 Therefore, the Paoli court reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment and remanded to the district court for further
proceedings. I I 
III. CONCLUSION
In Paoli, the Third Circuit attempted to ameliorate some of the ob-
stacles that impede the toxic tort victim's ability to recover. The Paoli
court recognized a new cause of action in Pennsylvania, the medical
monitoring tort.' 12 In order to recover for the costs of periodic medical
examinations under the medical monitoring tort, a plaintiff must estab-
lish that (1) the plaintiff was significantly exposed to the toxic substance
because of the negligent acts of the defendant; (2) as a proximate result
of the exposure, the plaintiff suffers a significantly increased risk of con-
tracting a serious latent disease; (3) the increased risk makes periodic
diagnostic medical exams reasonably necessary; and (4) monitoring
procedures exist which make early detection and treatment reasonably
necessary.' 11 Moreover, by not requiring that a plaintiff actually mani-
fest injury before he or she may recover for periodic medical examina-
tions, the Paoli court adopted a liberal standard of proof for the tort.' 14
Because toxic tort victims' injuries are most often latent, the Paoli court's
liberal approach provides protection for such plaintiffs.
In addition, the Paoli court used a liberal approach regarding the
admissibility of expert witness testimony in its interpretation of Federal
Rules of Evidence 703, 702 and 403.'1 5 This approach reflects a sensi-
tivity to the point that because a plaintiff cannot prove causation without
expert witnesses, a trial court's exclusion of the testimony will preclude
110. Id. at 860-62. The Paoli court adopted the elements of plaintiffs' prima
facie case that the district court had set forth. Id. at 860. The four elements that
the district court stated the plaintiffs were required to prove were: "1) that de-
fendants released PCBs into the environment; 2) that plaintiffs somehow in-
gested these PCBs into their bodies; 3) that plaintiffs have an injury; 4) that
PCBs are the cause of that injury." Id.
111. Id. at 865.
112. For a further discussion of the Paoli court's approach to the medical
monitoring tort, see supra notes 53-73 and accompanying text.
113. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852.
114. Id. at 850-52. For a discussion of the requirements that the Paoli court
imposed to sustain a cause of action for medical monitoring, see supra note 73
and accompanying text.
115. For a discussion of the liberal evidentiary approach of Paoli court, see
supra notes 74-111 and accompanying text.
On remand, however, the district court again refused to allow certain expert
testimony. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., No.s 80-2229, 86-2229, 86-2235,
86-2669, 86-5277, 86-7414 to 86-7422, 86-7561, 87-0712, 87-2874, 87-5269,
87-5304, 1992 WL 315216, at * 1-4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 1992) (noting exclusion of
various experts' testimony and granting defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment since "[p]laintiffs have no competent expert testimony on the crucial issues
of exposure and causation").
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any recovery for the plaintiff.' 16 First, the Paoli court affirmed its intent
to construe the requirements of Rule 702 liberally when a party seeks to
establish the qualifications of an expert witness.' 17 Furthermore, in con-
sidering the admissibility of novel scientific evidence under Rule 702,
the Paoli court reaffirmed its resolve to utilize the Downing reliability ap-
proach. 118 Thus, before a district court admits novel scientific evidence,
it must look to three factors: the reliability of the technique used in pro-
ducing the evidence; the possibility that admitting the evidence will mis-
lead the jury; and the connection between the research to be presented
and the factual issues in the case.' 19
Finally, as part of its liberal evidentiary approach, the Paoli court
strongly suggested that Rule 403 exclusions are impermissible at the
pre-trial stage. 120 Such a liberal approach to the admissibility of expert
witness testimony demonstrates the Paoli court's understanding of the
significant evidentiary burdens involved in toxic tort cases.
The evidentiary rulings set forth in Paoli send a strong message to
district courts faced with the issue of the admissibility of expert witness
testimony. Through its repetitious criticisms of the district court for not
indicating the testimony it excluded, the Paoli court instructed the dis-
trict courts to articulate the specific facts and theories relied upon before
excluding the testimony. 12 1 In addition, the Paoli court suggested that
the district courts should provide some type of trial surrogate for the
plaintiffs to defend their evidentiary submission before excluding the
testimony. '
22
The toxic tort victim faces an uphill battle in attempting to recover
for injury resulting from exposure to toxic substances. Toxic torts do
not fit within the traditional tort context, causation is extremely difficult
to prove in the area of toxic torts and judges are overly suspicious of
scientific testimony. Courts are beginning to respond to these difficulties
faced by plaintiffs. As a result of the Paoli decision, toxic tort plaintiffs
116. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 853. For a discussion of the necessity of expert wit-
ness testimony in proving a toxic tort case, see supra note 9 and accompanying
text.
117. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 855-56. For a discussion of the Paoli court's liberal
approach to the qualifications requirement of Rule 702, see supra notes 92-105
and accompanying text.
118. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 856. For a discussion of the Downing reliability ap-
proach, see supra notes 10 1-04 and accompanying text.
119. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985). For a
discussion of Downing, see supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
120. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 859-60. For a discussion of the Paoli court's Rule 403
analysis, see supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
121. Paol, 916 F.2d at 852-60. For a discussion of the district court's failure
to specify the expert testimony it excluded, see supra note 86.
122. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 859.
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are given a greater opportunity to present their case in the face of seem-
ingly overwhelming evidentiary obstacles.
Nol C. Birle
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